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Chapter 1
Introduction:  
the intimate life of dissent 
Harini Amarasuriya, Tobias Kelly, Sidharthan Maunaguru, 
Galina Oustinova-Stjepanovic and Jonathan Spencer
Natalya Gorbanevskaya, one of the participants in a Red Square protest 
against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, did 
something surprising: she brought her baby son to the demonstra-
tion even though she anticipated arrest. She pushed a pram with her 
child to the demonstration in the centre of the Square and unfurled 
a home- made banner. She then left the baby in the lobby of the KGB 
headquarters while she underwent an extensive interrogation. When 
asked by a KGB officer to name the father of her child, Gorbanevskaya 
refused, declaring that family issues were irrelevant. Yet in many ways 
her act of political opposition had been forged and sustained by relations 
with lovers, friends, family and with other dissidents. Gorbanevskaya’s 
mother, for example, both supported and fretted over her daughter’s 
political engagements. When Gorbanevskaya was charged with anti- 
Soviet agitation, her actions were said by the prosecutor to amount not 
only to a betrayal of the Soviet state, but also to a betrayal of her own 
children. She was cast as both a bad Soviet citizen and a bad mother. 
The jury then punished Gorbanevskaya with a lengthy confinement in 
a psychiatric ward, resulting in separation from her family and friends 
(many of whom shared her hostility towards the Soviet state). In one fell 
swoop, Gorbanevskaya seemed to have both transgressed and reinstated 
the boundary between the intimate life of sex and family and the public 
life of political protest. Her story shows what is at stake, both politically 
and personally, in acts of dissent. 
The chapters in this edited collection examine those moments 
when people take a stand, acting in ways that go against the grain 
of social and political life, often at great personal risk. For Soviet 
dissidents, Kurdish activists, Sri Lankan leftists, Orthodox Jewish Israelis, 
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Indonesian students and prisoners, Tibetan exiles and British pacifists, 
acts of dissent are attempts to take a position of principle, to set oneself 
up against the status quo. We might view such acts of dissent within a 
range of possible interpretive frames, such as ‘resistance’, ‘refusal’ or 
‘protest’ (McGranahan 2016; Simpson 2014; Weiss 2016), but we are 
particularly interested here in those acts where people declare or act on 
their commitments. 
Dissidence implies not just strong dissatisfaction, but also 
determined and open opposition. Such acts of dissent are found not 
so much in forms of hidden and subtle resistance, but in the processes 
that Leela Gandhi has described as ‘actively renouncing, refusing and 
rejecting’ (2006, 5). In this collection we are trying to understand the 
conditions of possibility for such acts, and the culturally thick meanings 
and significance with which they are inscribed. We do not wish to 
romanticise  dissent –  conservatism and xenophobic nationalism can 
be dissenting principles, after  all –  but rather to put acts of protest and 
refusal back into the thick social and cultural relations out of which they 
emerge and take effect. 
The term ‘dissent’ has a very particular and freighted  history 
–  linked most obviously with the Protestant Reformation and, more 
recently, anti- authoritarian politics and Cold War human rights (Arendt 
1972; Havel 1989; Shelby 2018, 264). Underpinned by a specific view 
of personal freedom, dissent in this tradition is presumed to emanate 
from within the individual and has been strongly linked to ideas of 
‘conscience’, ‘interiority’ and ‘authenticity’ (Boym 2010; Laidlaw 2002). 
Dissent here is a form of political disruption born in the moral individual. 
To dissent is both to protest in the face of injustice and to be true to 
oneself: a combination that Václav Havel called ‘living in truth’ (1989). 
Indeed, acts of dissent are seen to represent a residual and radical 
humanity that cannot be crushed by authoritarianism, totalitarianism or 
political horror. 
Dissidents can be awkward in their commitment to freedom, even 
iconoclastic in the way they hold fast to their  principles –  but for them not 
to dissent would be somehow ethically corrupting. ‘Silence’, as Nadezdha 
Mandelstam put it, ‘would be the real crime against humanity’. The 
dissenting heroes of the liberal imagination are therefore people such 
as Mandelstam, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Václav Havel and Ken Saro- Wiwa. 
They may seem idiosyncratic and awkward, but their dissent is often seen 
as a positive  virtue –  one that not only allows the dissenter to be ‘true to 
oneself’, but also serves as a powerful social and political corrective to the 
injustice around them. 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   2 30/07/2020   13:31
 InTrODuCTIOn  3
Although the term ‘dissent’ may resonate within the histories of 
liberal politics and Protestant Christianity, its meanings and implica-
tions are not constrained by those traditions. Ethnographic and historical 
evidence points instead to multiplicity:  dissent –  as an act of renouncing, 
refusing and  rejecting –  can assume many forms and is not limited to 
individual acts of moral protest. As Oustinova- Stjepanovic shows in 
chapter 2, for example, dissent in the late Soviet period was manifest 
not only in public demonstrations, but also sometimes in seemingly 
absurd forms of conceptual exile and artistic estrangement. Similarly, 
Erica Weiss has suggested in chapter 3 that the peace activism of liberal 
and ultra- Orthodox Jews may be defined by a common goal, but builds 
on radically different, even incompatible moral premises. If dissent is 
often associated with particular forms of freedom, individualism and 
aesthetics, these links are therefore not as self- evident as they might 
appear. Dissent, for example, can be thought of as a form of obligation 
or a duty as much as an expression of freedom. There often seems to be a 
sense (in Geertz’s (1968) formulation) that we are held by the convictions 
that ground our dissent, rather than that we hold them. Furthermore, 
even within the liberal tradition, not all forms of dissent are seen as 
equal. Individuals do not stand free and unencumbered, but are always 
marked by histories of inequality. Some people find it easier to enter 
the space of dissent than others. The sense that dissent somehow has its 
origins deep inside the individual can also cause unease, as a valorisation 
of sincerity produces anxieties about authenticity and dissenters can be 
viewed as degenerate trouble makers as much as moral saints. In short, 
there are many cultures of dissent. 
The central argument of this volume is that foregrounding intimacy 
can help us to parochialise liberal notions of dissent, and their associated 
forms of agency, personhood and change. Dissidents are not simply 
lone individuals with abstract ideals; they are also caught up in other, 
sometimes contradictory aspirations and relationships and forms of 
responsibility. Dissent does not just reverberate through public acts, but 
also in the most intimate of relations, and the social world of dissidents 
and activists is often a place of especially intense sociality. For liberal 
theorists such as John Rawls (1993), dissent is carried out by abstract 
individuals, seemingly devoid of personal ties. When Rawls writes of 
anti- war activists and their acts of civil disobedience during the Vietnam 
war, it is as if they have no social relations and act solely as moral 
individuals alone against the world, weighing up what is good and right 
to do in the face of violence, coercion and domination. Yet the memoirs 
of dissidents are full of descriptions both of how they gained support 
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and succour from loved ones and of the tragic consequences of their 
action for their own families (Yakir 1972). Acts of dissent can therefore 
involve the making and breaking of specific intimate attachments of 
kinship, friendship and solidarity, just as much as commitments to high 
principles. 
We understand intimacy here as being linked to the experience of 
familiarity within friendship, family and love, but as also going beyond 
 that –  opening up what Lauren Berlant has described as a ‘range of 
attachments’ that ‘links the instability of individual lives to the trajecto-
ries of the collective’ (1998, 283; see also Herzfeld 2005). Ties of family, 
friendship and sex are therefore not the only sources of intimacy, 
although they can be a very important part. Or, to put this another way, 
the intimate is exhausted neither by kinship ties nor the private realm. 
As Michael Herzfeld (2005) has argued, for example, the idea of the 
nation can be invoked through the register of intimacy too, creating 
shared frustrations, embarrassments and aspirations. Intimacy works 
across different scales, implying closeness but not necessarily proximity, 
gesturing to forms of broader mutual identification, at the levels of the 
family, but also of the nation, the religious community or other publics. 
In this process, and importantly for our argument, the very distinction 
between private ideas and public action begins to break down. Intimacy 
is also not an inherently positive experience or virtue: it can be fraught, 
claustrophobic and coercive, as well as caring and supportive.
Thinking of dissent as intimate helps us to move beyond the narrow 
notions of the individual by putting dissidence back in the histories of the 
dense social relations from which it emerges (Berlant 1998, 282; Berlant 
and Warner 1998, 553; see also Laurie and Stark 2017, 73). We might 
say that dissent is both enabled and contained by our intimate relations, 
and we can only understand the intensity of acts of dissent, and the risks 
they entail, if we also understand the intimate ties, tensions and contra-
dictions within which they are enmeshed. Intimate ties can exist in tragic 
tension with forms of political dissent, or they can provide the energy 
upon which dissent thrives. Either way, we cannot understand dissent 
unless we understand its often fraught relationship with intimacy.
At one level, putting intimacy and dissent into the same frame 
might seem an awkward move. In the popular imagination, dissidents 
are moved by a commitment to what is right or wrong that transcends 
their own narrow self- interest and personal ties. Bonhoeffer, Havel and 
Saro- Wiwa went to jail and Bonhoeffer and Saro- Wiwa were executed 
for standing firm by their ideals; they left behind lovers, children, family 
and friends, who could only watch in a tragic mixture of admiration and 
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despair. As the anthropology of ethics has tried to show, many people act 
out of a deep commitment to ideals of what is right, good and just, rather 
than the partiality of specific ties and interests (Laidlaw 2002; Schielke 
2015). These are ideals that, as Samuli Schielke argues, can appear 
distant, ‘external and superior to everyday experience’ (2015, 13). And 
as Alberto Toscano (2010) has similarly argued, people are often moved 
by abstract ideals in a way that makes political action both possible and 
imaginable. Ideas of class, nation and religion evoke much more than 
the here and now. That is precisely why they are such a powerful force in 
people’s lives, one that can compel them to act under the most difficult 
of circumstances. 
We should not though overplay the distinction between abstract 
commitments and intimate relations. If intimacy is not simply about 
known personal relations, but also about wider ties of familiarity 
(Herzfeld 2005), the lines between intimate relations and abstract 
principles blur. At one level, convictions are shaped and given meaning 
through the dense flux and flow of relations with friends, children, 
parents, siblings, lovers, comrades and others. Commitments are rarely 
just commitments to ideas, but also, as Michael Walzer (1970) has 
pointed out, obligations to people who we might know, love and respect. 
People tend to die, for example, not simply for country, God or class, but 
also for friends, comrades and lovers. As Veena Das (2007) has argued, 
ideals do not transcend the world of everyday relations and experiences: 
they rather emerge through and as part of them. Furthermore, as 
Mathijs Pelkmans has also argued, abstract commitments can have 
a deeply affective dimension; as he puts it, ‘we can be moved by our 
principles’ (2017). The commitments for which we might take a stand 
can be deeply personal in a profound sense. Foregrounding intimacy 
therefore helps us to move away from a stark contrast between abstract 
principles and dense social relationships. It is not that the ties that bind 
are simply put at risk by grand schemes and ideals, but rather that all 
schemes and ideas gain meaning and possibility through those ties in 
the first place.
We might be tempted to understand dissent as an issue of ‘politics’ 
or ‘ethics’ – a play of power and resistance, or a product of a commitment 
to ethical virtue and normative principles. The last 30 years of anthro-
pology have produced numerous important insights into ways in which 
people resist multiple forms of domination (Abu- Lughod 1990; Simpson 
2014). In partial contrast, some of the recent work in the anthropology 
of ethics has pushed back against an understanding of political action as 
linked to instrumental forms of action, in favour of an emphasis on the 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   5 30/07/2020   13:31
6 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
cultivation of ethical selves and judgements (Laidlaw 2002; Mattingly 
2014). But using the frame of intimacy helps to show that both an ‘ethical 
virtue’ and ‘power and resistance’ approach to dissent can be too reduc-
tionist, failing to grasp the dense and often contradictory bonds within 
which people live alongside one another, the grounds upon which they 
protest and the implications of doing so. 
It is not that ‘ethics’ and ‘politics’, or even ‘kinship’, do not  matter – 
 they matter  intensely –  but rather that our hopes, fears and relationships 
cannot be neatly constrained within these frames. Our intimate ties cut 
across these domains, even as they might sometimes push them apart. 
The forms of dissent explored in this volume are not simply stories of 
great lives lived alone or family melodramas, nor are they simply lives 
of high principle or intense calculation, but all and neither at the same 
time. Commitments are lived and struggled with in a way that is not 
reducible to something called politics, ethics or kinship, but through a 
shifting, fraught and sometimes inspiring combination of multiple forms 
of always intimate obligation and attachment. 
Domains of dissent
In his monumental account of the early years of the Soviet Union, Yuri 
Slezkine (2017, 334–5) cites at some length an architectural vision 
of the proposed social relations of the new society that was coming 
into existence. The new men and women of the Soviet era would be 
housed in vast collective blocks. On entering the block, they would first 
pass through an area dedicated to personal hygiene and cleanliness 
before entering the zone of sociality and the collective ‘American- style’ 
cafeteria, where all were to eat. Finally, past all this, residents would 
have access to their strictly individual sleeping rooms. Sex, reproduction 
and the responsibilities of parenthood were all epiphenomenal to the 
vision of a new order. This would be a regime in which intimacy would to 
a great extent be rendered architecturally unthinkable. 
The story of Slezkine’s book, though, is of the Soviet failure 
to remake intimate relations on rational, socialist lines, as orthodox 
Marxist expectations about the imminent end of the bourgeois family 
came up against what we might, in retrospect, see as the intransigence 
of the intimate. ‘The Bolsheviks’ early attempts to reform the family,’ 
Slezkine concludes, ‘were soon abandoned in favour of an acceptance 
that remained untheorized and apparently irrelevant to the building of 
Communism’ (2017, 953).
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But intimacy can present an opportunity as well as a challenge 
for would- be revolutionaries. Alpa Shah (2013), for example, argues 
against attempts to explain local support for Indian Naxalites in terms of 
purely material factors (so- called ‘greed or grievance’), in favour of an 
explanation which attends more closely to the idioms of intimacy that 
draw in, and hold onto, the loyalties of the rural poor. Young recruits 
to the Maoists are at once attracted by the familiarity of the cadres they 
 join –  brothers, sisters,  cousins –  while also seeking to escape the impos-
sibility of their own domestic circumstances, the overbearing father, the 
threat of an unwanted marriage. Intimacy, this case reminds us, cuts two 
ways, promising warmth and solidarity, but as often delivering conflict 
and division. And the blurring of the boundary between the intimate and 
the political is, of course, one source of the peculiarly bitter dynamics 
of local- level civil wars. In such conflicts accusations of treachery and 
betrayal are most often hurled at those who would otherwise appear 
to be close, sometimes resulting in the most intense forms of violence 
(Kalyvas 2006; Thiranagama and Kelly 2010). 
These two examples, read together, show that the politics of 
intimacy are unlikely to be simple or straightforward. For would- be 
revolutionaries, captivated by top- down, totalising visions of social and 
political change, the intimate, as a bounded enclave in social life, 
threatens to undermine the integrity of the big vision. But, at the same 
time, the sentimental intimate, the promised warmth of comradeship, 
of brotherhood and sisterhood, offers the possibility of scaling up into 
bigger forms of solidarity. They also show that the intimate has been a 
source of potential dissonance for radical political projects well before 
the 1960s reminder that ‘the personal is political’. As Hanisch put it, 
in a classic second- wave feminist intervention, ‘Personal problems are 
political problems. There are no personal solutions at this time. There 
is only collective action for a collective solution’ (1970). There is a 
subtle difference in intent here, though, between second- wave feminism 
and the socialist revolutionary projects described above. The ‘political’ 
here is less a totalising project, but rather more a pervasive reality, 
an inescapable dimension of all social relations. This argument finds 
a familiar academic echo in Foucault’s 1960s and 1970s writings on 
power. But, as Heberle (2016) shows in a useful recent survey, it was 
much more widespread as a point of departure across a range of 1960s 
social  movements –  anti- war, anti- racist, anti- patriarchy. 
What follows from this, as the history of the last 50 years amply 
attests, is really not at all simple. The invocation of the ‘personal as 
political’ raises questions of scale, of strategy, of consistency and of 
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potential compromises and trade- offs. These have become as much 
practical questions for those who would act politically as they are 
theoretical questions for those who would simply analyse. In part this is 
because the intimate plays tricks on us all: intimacy is the zone in which 
individual lives should take their proper shape, yet intimacy is precisely 
the area where we seem to have least control over the shape our lives 
take (Berlant 1998). The expectation of stability in intimate relations is 
inseparable from the experience of instability. The desire to bound off 
the intimate from the unruliness of the wider world is at odds with the 
weakness of the boundary itself.
But boundaries matter,  even –  or  especially –  blurred boundaries. 
We should be careful lest we collapse intimacy, kinship and politics, or 
the public and the private for that matter, into one another too quickly. 
Rather we need to pay attention to their productive points of tension. 
At one level, intimacy within a family, even if chosen (Weston 1997), 
can be very different from intimacy within an orchestra or within a 
political demonstration. Not all intimacy is the same. At another level, 
intimacy does not exhaust all social relations, and there is more to life 
than feeling intimate. Intimacy has its own qualities too; it cannot be 
reduced simply to politics or the social. In the recent anthropology 
of activism, questions of class, sexuality and gender have been given 
important analytical weight (Dave 2012; Howe 2013), but activists have 
also sometimes been analysed as if they are political, and only political, 
all the way down. 
There is a lesson to be learned here from the anthropology of 
Islam and Christianity, which has also occasionally treated people as if 
a description of their self- consciously religious life projects can mean-
ingfully ignore their other cross- cutting and sometimes contradictory 
aspirations, obligations and commitments, as well as the inevitable 
tensions and failures involved in this process. As Schielke (2015; cf. 
Mahmood 2004) has reminded us, people are always caught between 
conflicting and contradictory political, ethical and social projects. In a 
similar vein, in the anthropology of politics, everything has sometimes 
been treated as political. As a result the idea of the political easily 
becomes conceptually, culturally and sociologically flat, with nothing to 
push off against (Candea 2011; Curtis and Spencer 2012).
The intimate dimensions of dissent therefore do not necessarily 
crowd out all others, but can exist in parallel, or in tension, with the 
possibility of changing both, folding and unfolding into one another 
(Das 2007). Unbounded intimacy, like the relentless politicisation of 
everything, can sound attractive as an abstract project, even if it is 
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impossible to achieve in practice. Indeed, it is often the very relationship 
between the intimate and the political that is at stake in acts of dissent. 
Rather than simply doing away with the distinction between 
kinship and politics, the public and the private or intimacy and its 
others, we need to understand how these distinctions are produced and 
contested, valorised and denigrated in particular contexts, and how 
these processes in turn give shape and meanings to both intimacy and 
dissent. The Intimate Life of Dissent therefore pays particular attention to 
the ways in which the meanings and implications of dissent are formed 
specifically through the contingent relationship between the ‘political’ 
and its counters. 
Many of the political projects described in this volume involve 
an attempt to collapse the distinctions between the intimate and the 
political, in the face of sometimes considerable resistance, in order to 
create the grounds of dissent. These are projects which try to produce a 
unitary life world, where the personal is the political, sometimes from the 
top down and sometimes from the bottom up. And it is here that many 
of the key tensions described in the volume can be found, as the ties that 
bind pull in different directions. The allure of consistency, from top to toe, 
rubs up against multiple responsibilities and relationships, both intimate 
and otherwise, within which people live their lives. The result is friction. 
Some forms of dissent are about expanding the intimate and some are 
about bounding it, but either way there is a sense of concomitant danger. 
In chapter 4 Serra Hakyemez describes how Kurdish activists, 
imprisoned and tortured by the Turkish state, develop forms of intimacy, 
caught as they are between class and kin and grounded in their shared 
experiences of suffering. The Turkish prison regime imposes a programme 
of violence, and the Kurdish movement’s prison organisation seeks to 
produce its own revolutionary subjects through a counter- programme 
of education and bodily discipline. The moment a person steps inside 
a prison, the Kurdish prison committee introduces him or her to the 
communal life of political prisoners designed to turn newcomers into a 
loyal heval (comrade), thereby eradicating any private sense of self. But 
the Kurdish term heval implies both comrade and friend. It is therefore a 
source of possible tension, at once speaking to the possibility of revolu-
tionary politics while also implicitly acknowledging its limits. 
Hakyemez describes the unease caused when one prisoner asked 
the court not to disclose the tapped private conversations he had with 
his ‘social friend’ in the presence of his ‘political friends’ – the implication 
being that he has an intimate relationship with the former that extends 
beyond the comradeship among the latter. In this seemingly small 
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gesture, the very relationship between the political and the social is at 
stake. 
The new men and women of revolutionary socialist politics, for 
whom private life is supposedly eradicated in the name of class solidar-
ity, provide numerous examples of the attempt to collapse the intimate 
and  the political. The early Soviet state’s attempted eradication of the 
nuclear family represents one of the greatest failures of the Soviet politi-
cal project (Slezkine 2017). In chapter 2 Galina Oustinova- Stjepanovic 
describes the Soviet regime’s persistent attempts to impose a regime of 
top- down intimacy: the singular intimacy of ‘we’, the Soviet people. The 
people and the state of the USSR were said to exist in a seamless, singular 
and unified whole, an inescapable oneness. 
Importantly, the language of totality was evoked both by the 
regime and its opponents. For critics, the totality of the Soviet state was 
the brutality of the totalitarian. But, as Oustinova- Stjepanovic explains, 
this created a conundrum for dissidents. If the Soviet state was a totality, 
there was no exterior space the dissidents could claim from which to resist 
and oppose. Their response was instead a form of estrangement from the 
state, an attempt to create a moral ‘outside’ that was most obviously 
found in non- instrumental forms of artistic expression and dense social 
relationships. In this case the meanings and possibilities of dissent are 
produced through struggles over the meanings of the intimate.
The intimate politics of dissent
How does intimacy shape the forms of dissent? In much political theory 
there has been a distinct analytical severing of the intimate from the 
political. Most obviously, Hannah Arendt sought to draw a sharp 
distinction between the personal and intimate ties of the household 
and the public life of politics (1958). Indeed, her definition of politics 
was expressly based on the very distinction between the intimate and 
the public. This is a distinction that also runs through much liberal 
politics, where intimate ties are often seen as somehow polluting political 
commitments and attempts are sometimes made to protect the private 
lives of politicians from public glare. 
More recent work has sought to examine the ways in which 
disruptive forms of politics might emerge out of intimate life. Giorgio 
Agamben, for example, has argued that intimate practices help to bring 
‘the political out of concealment’ (Bordeleau 2017, 482). For Agamben, 
acts of dissent bring an otherwise inchoate politics into view by putting 
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the self and its relations with others at stake (Bordeleau 2017, 490). 
Intimacy here provides the grounds and affective labour necessary 
for political action. As Saidiya Hartman argues, intimacy can be the 
‘insurgent ground that enables new possibilities’, rooted in the affective 
labour central to political action (2019, 227). Indeed, one of the greatest 
predictors of whether someone will participate in an act of dissent is 
whether they know someone closely who is already involved (McAdam 
1988). It is not simply that private and intimate convictions are taken 
out into the public realm, but that intimacy itself is generative of political 
positions and relationships. 
What is needed is a more nuanced sense of both intimacy and 
the possibilities of political disruption. As Serra Hakyemez describes in 
chapter 4, it is the intimacy created by the shared experience of torture 
by the Turkish state that creates the possibility of political solidarity 
within the prison. Hakyemez draws on another part of the work of 
Hannah Arendt in arguing that relationships formed through witnessing 
mutual suffering create the grounds for ‘being together’ and therefore 
acting politically. She develops Arendt’s analogy of oases, ‘those fields 
of life which exist independently, or largely so, from political conditions’ 
(Arendt 2005, 202). In this analogy the ‘political conditions’ are the 
desert of the totalitarian; the oasis represents a space that escapes such 
a totalising project, or escapes it just sufficiently to allow a flicker of 
passion and creativity to kindle and burn. As Arendt argues, we may 
act together ‘in the inherently worldless relationship between human 
beings as it exists in love and sometimes in  friendship –  when one 
heart reaches out directly to the others, as in friendship, or when the 
in- between, the world, goes up on flames, as in love’ (Arendt 2005, 202). 
These spaces, and the intimacy that animates them, are not the spaces 
of compulsory comradeship imposed by the movement’s programme of 
prison discipline. To tease out what they are, Hakyemez makes a detour 
into the etymology of local idioms of the intimate and the significance of 
the ‘private space’ and the ‘forbidden’ in creating the grounds for other 
 possibilities –  which in turn challenge the iron logic of the totalitarian 
version of the political. 
Not only can dissent grow out of intimate ties, but it can also 
produce its own new ties of intimacy. Elsewhere Dave, for example, has 
shown how queer activism in India forges new relationships (2012, 64). 
These ties are seldom simple, however. In chapter 5 Amarasuriya and 
Spencer’s account of the life of one Sri Lankan radical, Joe Seneviratne, 
starts with a father dramatically giving away his errant son’s dinner to 
the dog, with dramatic results: ‘I said, my house is not here, but the whole 
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world, and I left home’. First the party, then particular comrades pick Joe 
up and find him work, food and shelter. Intimacy is a constant theme 
in the account of his life that Joe composes in his conversations with 
Amarasuriya. In this he describes turning his back on home and family, 
placing his trust in comrades (and the bitter lessons of betrayal) and 
experiencing the impossible tug between obligations to wife and children 
and the demands of the party. 
Clearly, some forms of dissent can exist in tension with intimate 
ties. For Michel Foucault, for example, what he calls parrhesia (fearless 
speech) is not simply controversial speech for the sake of speech, but 
also involves the speaker knowing that it might put their relationships 
at risk (2001). Dissent is dissent here, precisely because it puts our 
most precious ties at stake. Not only do acts of dissent put intimate 
ties under strain, however. On the one hand, the burdens and implica-
tions of dissent are often borne most intensely by those to whom the 
dissenter is personally close. On the other hand, the very rupturing and 
severing of personal relations is the enabling condition of dissent; for 
those involved in forms of dissent, family and friends become neglected 
and barely visible. There is considerable evidence to suggest that people 
with fewer family ties (however those may be measured) are more likely 
to participate in more radical actions, and limiting obligation to people 
outside a movement is a key indicator of longevity within it (Whittier 
1995). But as Amarasuriya and Spencer point out, breaking ties is not 
confined to intimate relations: splits, ruptures and breaks are part of 
the long history of oppositional politics in all parts of the world. There is 
scope for thinking about the move from personal splits to bigger political 
splits and back again, and for considering what might happen to the 
affective consequences of breaks and ruptures with the shift in scale.
Dissent can also be straightforwardly socially corrosive, working 
against intimate relations. In chapter 6 Tobias Kelly describes how, in 
mid- twentieth century Britain, conscience was both valorised as an 
authentic ground of moral autonomy and at the same time suspected 
as a form of vanity and delusion. His chapter focuses on conscientious 
objectors to military service in the Second World War. He describes 
the resolute convictions of the tens of thousands of peace activists 
who refused conscription and the fight against fascism. As long as they 
were willing to do alternative forms of service, such as humanitarian 
work patching up the wounded, they were widely tolerated, often even 
respected, by the British public for sticking to their principles. A small 
minority refused to take any direction from the state, however, and many 
of these ended up in jail. 
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Although many conscientious objectors came to the decision not 
to fight as part of intense conversations and experiences with friends, 
comrades and lovers, the eventual decision to refuse to fight could also 
be very lonely and full of doubt. Certainly some conscientious objectors 
were accused of being anti- social, self- obsessed and self- indulgent. As 
Susan Sontag has argued elsewhere, the moral heroes of our ‘liberal 
civilization’ are often regarded with a ‘mixture of revulsion, pity and 
reverence’ (1963). The occlusion of kinship ties and disregard of intimate 
backgrounds is sometimes seen as a mythical source of ‘Western’ 
creativity in the sense of the capacity to move, explore, conquer and 
think freely (Bashkow 2006). But such freedom comes at a cost. Dissent, 
particularly in its most liberal forms, walks a tight line between moral 
virtue and arrogant pride.
Intimacy can also work across political lines: you are not only 
intimate with your political allies. An understanding of politics as rooted 
in the distinction between friends and enemies (Schmitt 2007) is upended 
by an examination of the dense relationships that can exist across political 
lines, where a combination of proximity and difference can transform 
social relations. As Leela Gandhi argues, friendships can produce dissident 
solidarities that cut through the exclusionary logics of many forms of 
politics (2006). There are numerous examples of how,  for  example, 
returnees from Soviet prison camps, rejected by families, then became 
friends and drinking buddies with the guards whom they had despised 
in their confinement. As Sidharthan Maunaguru describes in chapter 
7, political intimacy can traverse the institutional distinction between 
friends and foes (see also Klumbyte. 2011). Maunaguru asks whether it 
is possible to be a friend and a political rival, and explores the struggle to 
maintain friendship in the face of political violence. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the example of Ranjan, a Sri Lankan Tamil 
refugee and exile now living in the UK. Ranjan was an early member 
of PLOTE, a radical leftist Tamil group that emerged in the 1970s. 
However, he soon fell out with the leadership, which he denounced for 
its promotion of what he saw as an undemocratic cult of personality. 
The result was an assassination attempt and threats on Ranjan’s life, 
as he moved from a position of political affinity to one marked by 
accusations of treachery and eventually enmity. Ranjan finally made 
his way to the UK, where he worked as a street sweeper and cleaner and 
tried to support his fellow Sri Lankan exiles in whatever way he could. 
At one point he helped another former member of PLOTE, who had 
once followed the orders of the leadership and tried to kill him. Ranjan 
remained deeply critical of his friend’s political views, but believed that 
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an ethical commitment to democratic politics meant that, in the midst of 
the splintering violence of Sri Lankan and Tamil politics, he was obliged 
to maintain friendships across political lines. We are a world away here 
from the Schmittian definition of politics. If for Schmitt (2007) it is the 
distinction between friend and enemy that forms the basis of politics, for 
people such as Ranjan an ethical politics must work to erode that very 
distinction.
We should not inevitably associate either dissent or intimacy with 
positive virtues. As Berlant (1998, 286) drily observes, intimacy ‘only 
rarely makes sense of things’. For its part, intimacy may be disruptive 
or dissonant, but it can be coercive too (Sa’ar 2001; Strange 2018). 
The inequalities and forms of violence that mark intimate relations 
can also run through public acts of dissent, as the act of taking a stand 
can be inflected by the same hierarchies of gender, class and race that 
shape intimate ties. Intimacy can also be stifling or claustrophobic. It 
is not just a resource for dissent, but can also be the very thing people 
wish to dissent against, particularly in the context of gendered forms 
of inequality. Intimacy certainly has its ‘dark sides’ (Geschiere 1997; 
Jamieson 1998; Klein 1967), creating vulnerability, coercion and anxiety 
as much as care and support. Or, to put this another way, intimacy can be 
marked by fear and suspicion as much as trust and comfort.
Dissent itself can also be very conventional. As dissent draws 
people into particular and perhaps new forms of intimacy, it also creates 
its own norms and ties. Dissent is therefore not a simple synonym for 
subversion; it creates attachments of its own and can morph into loyalty 
and conformity to its own principles. Dissent can be deeply orthodox 
and conformist, a privilege even. At some point dissent stops being itself, 
giving way to other solidarities and alliances. Furthermore, importantly, 
dissent from one perspective can look like compliance from another. But 
if intimacy is associated with affinity and closeness, dissent might imply 
disagreement and discord. There is therefore a potential paradox at the 
heart of dissent, in that it both brings people together and pushes them 
apart. 
We are left with a set of questions about the ways in which acts of 
dissent might be disruptive of, or simply a way to reproduce, existing 
social relations. Is dissent a social anomaly, and a break from the ordinary 
flux and flow of life? Or is it rather something to be understood as itself 
forming social and political relations? How do intimate relations both 
work against and produce the conditions of dissent? Do particular types 
of intimacy encourage people to take a stand? Do they indeed shape such 
acts, and when do they act as a break or an impediment? 
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In chapter 8 Carole McGranahan shows how dissent both works 
within and against normative frames, subtly and not so subtly working 
along and against the grain of convention. Chapter 8 describes how 
over the course of the twentieth century the Pangdatsang family from 
eastern Tibet rose from being traders far away from the centres of power 
to intimates of the Dalai Lama. They achieved this through strategic 
acts of both subversion and loyalty, both playing by the rules and 
breaking them, in a situation where power was supposed to be reserved 
for the central Tibetan aristocracy. This is a family who included anti- 
colonial politicians, Buddhist loyalists and Communist Party officials. 
But the family’s very presence in Lhasa was itself a form of dissent from 
aristocratic hierarchy, enabled by submission and acquiescence. For 
McGranahan, the dissent of this family was always entangled within 
wider webs of obligation, and it is these entanglements that make 
dissent so dangerous. An act of opposition is also an act of loyalty and, 
perhaps most importantly, an act of loyalty can also be seen as an act of 
opposition.
Socialities of dissent
How do we know dissent when we see it? Dissent is always embedded 
in dense webs of cultural meaning and social relationships. Different 
types of sociality therefore produce different forms of both intimacy and 
dissent. Dissent does not always have to involve taking to the streets, 
but it always involves some attempt at communication, however small 
or unclear the intended audience. Dissent must therefore be located in 
relationships, rather than in individual moments of intentionality. It 
can be aimed at getting things done, to bring about change, or it can 
be understood as an end in itself. Even if it is only aimed at the self, 
however, it also involves making otherwise intangible commitments 
somehow more concrete. There are therefore important questions about 
the types of  claim –  and the types of  action –  that are seen as dissenting, 
both by dissenters themselves and by others, and about which claims and 
which actions are seen as legitimate and significant. Most significantly, 
how is dissent made tangible or visible? 
In chapter 3 Erica Weiss compares what she calls the liberal and 
secular dissent of conscientious objectors to military service as she 
explores the dissent of ultra- Orthodox Jewish women peace activists. 
For liberal peace activists, dissent is grounded in an individual will that 
stands above narrow calculation, and there is a wider public celebration 
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of such forms of disruption. As the saying goes, ‘We might not agree with 
what you are saying, but we respect your right to say it’. In contrast, for 
ultra- Orthodox Jewish peace activists, there are plenty of differences of 
opinion, but iconoclasm has little aesthetic or moral appeal and there is 
an emphasis on finding internal consensus, especially before speaking 
beyond the ultra- Orthodox community. Compromise here is not seen 
as morally corrosive but as morally virtuous; moral authority is not 
thought to lie in the individual, but is instead collective and hierarchi-
cally organised. 
There are very different moral grammars and aesthetic judgements 
at work in this comparison. As Weiss argues, we need to be careful not 
to fall into the trap where we analytically identify dissent with particular 
‘rhetorics, aesthetics and structures’ that reflect narrow ‘assumptions 
about moral decision- making’ and the ‘ethics of self- presentation’. For 
Weiss, the media and public discourse tend to celebrate liberal, secular 
forms of dissent, but often miss the subtler, backstage, community- 
focused forms of dissent found among ultra- Orthodox Jews. One of 
the key points to take from chapter 3 is that we need to pay attention 
to modes of dissent that are differentially recognised as appropriate 
in different contexts. Perhaps counter- intuitively, dissent has its own 
conventions. 
The mediums through which dissent is communicated and given 
meaning are central to the ways in which it is understood and given 
meaning. For Foucault (2001), for example, speech, in the form of par-
rhesia, is central to dissent: dissent is a linguistic activity that involves 
speaking truth. But texts can also have a particularly significant role to 
play here: the very acts of reading and writing can play a specific role in 
mediating dissent (Cody 2013). Dissidents are famous as much for what 
they write as for what they say, and writers have a particularly prominent 
role in the public imagination of dissent. If texts hold a privileged place 
in the communication of dissent, reading and writing are also about 
more than communication. They can also be central to the intimate 
grounds of dissent. At one level both reading and writing, in their dif-
ferent ways, are deeply personal experiences, potentially reproducing 
particular forms of interiority. Yet at another level reading and writing 
are also deeply shared experiences. Not only is writing, in most of its 
forms, about communicating with others, but reading and writing can 
play an important role in the imagination of collective forms of life. As 
Sidharthan Maunaguru and Tobias Kelly both describe, in chapters 7 and 
6 respectively, the acts of reading and writing play a central role in the 
sociality of political activists, be this in contemporary Sri Lanka or Britain 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   16 30/07/2020   13:31
 InTrODuCTIOn  17
during the Second World War. Far from being a solitary act, reading 
and writing are intensely social, drawing people into dense political 
relationships. 
In chapter 9 Doreen Lee describes how political prisoners 
and  student dissidents in 1990s Indonesia engaged in the writing and 
circulation of texts, often with the help of their family, friends and 
strangers. She describes the joy of two former activists on meeting 
one another after many years, their memories focused less on shared 
ideals and commitments and more on the shared sensuous work of 
grappling with photocopies and duplicators to produce political leaflets 
and posters. While the production of such texts gave ideas a tangible 
material form in ink and paper, and the evidence of dissent was often to 
be found in such papers, the processes of production were as important 
for dissident students as the actual words on the page. 
As Lee argues, an analytical focus on the intimate world of paper 
can help us to understand those ties that bind political activists, away 
from ‘ideological propulsion’ or the ‘overwhelming force of protest’. 
For Lee, the apparently ordinary but intimate and shared labour of 
running the printing machine helped to conscript people into political 
activities that stretched across space and time. This production of the 
paper artefacts of dissent was a craft that revealed new political forms 
(Lee 2016, 30). Often read in secrecy, dissident texts changed hands, 
entering and transforming social, political and interpersonal relations. 
New publics and new political relationships were called into being 
through the production of words on the page.
Questions of recognition and misrecognition are central to the 
process of dissent. And recognition can itself be a form of privilege. In 
hierarchical settings the right to be heard is if anything more important 
than the right to speak (Burghart 1996). Not all forms of dissent are 
recognised as such, and not all forms of dissent are deemed politically 
legitimate. As McGranahan shows in chapter 8, the everyday details of a 
life can be read by the state as mundane or subversive, depending on the 
frame within which they are placed. If dissent is an issue of interpreta-
tion, rather than being an innate quality of an act, it is often therefore 
deeply ambiguous, containing both forms of protest and loyalty that can 
be read in different ways by different audiences. 
In what might be called the liberal imagination, dissent is founda-
tional for both a particular type of citizenship and for moral personhood 
(Kelly 2015). To dissent is to show the capacity for ethical reflection 
and autonomy: dissent is therefore both a moral and political virtue. As 
Erica Weiss reveals, for example, Israeli conscientious objectors work 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   17 30/07/2020   13:31
18 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
with a moral vocabulary that valorises the capacity for ethical freedom. 
Yet at the same time firm boundaries are placed around how people 
can dissent and in what ways, and around what is said to ‘count’ as an 
authorised form of dissent. Not all issues are dealt with equally as issues 
of conscience, and not all people can equally persuade others that their 
conscience is genuine. As Kelly has described elsewhere, for example 
(2015), not all forms of opposition to war are given the same weight 
within liberal democracies. To be persuasive, conscience often has to 
be tempered and individual, and claims of conscience are often most 
persuasively made by those deemed to be loyal citizens.
We might see the recognition of dissent as diagnostic of particular 
social formations, in the sense that what is understood as an act of dissent 
can help us understand what aspects of social relations are understood as 
significant and important for social reproduction (Abu- Lughod 1990). 
Audiences for dissent can take many forms and, rather than being 
unified, should be understood as varied and hierarchical (Warner 2002). 
We might also ask who is watching, who is noticing and who cares? What 
happens when no one takes any notice? And what happens when an 
audience attributes meanings that were not intended by their authors? 
Seemingly innocent acts can be labelled as radical, and acts designed to 
be disruptive might be ignored. 
In chapter 2 Galina Oustinova- Stjepanovic describes how acts 
of seeming political dissidence were reframed by the Soviet state as 
evidence of mental health problems, as delusions and mental pathology 
that could be treated therapeutically. However, she also questions why 
the Soviet state seemed to care so much. Why did it go out of its way to 
respond to criticisms of the state that were commonplace, and even aired 
by people at the centre of the regime? Her answer is that it was not so 
much what was said that was at stake, but how it was said, and where. 
Dissidents tried to create an artistic and moral space that was somehow 
‘outside’ the Soviet state. Through their estrangement they challenged 
the state’s very claim to totality. Dissent matters here, precisely because 
it was so seemingly inconsequential.
Taken together, the chapters in The Intimate Life of Dissent – 
ranging across Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, Tibet, Britain, Sri Lanka and 
 Russia –  examine the conditions under which people take a stand on 
issues of principle, at great potential risk to themselves. British consci-
entious objectors refuse to take up arms, Indonesian students print 
political pamphlets, Kurdish prisoners maintain tight bonds of loyalty 
in the face of a deracinating prison environment, ultra- Orthodox Jewish 
Israelis meet with Palestinian Muslim women, Soviet dissidents struggle 
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to maintain a social and moral space outside the suffocating embrace 
of the Soviet state, Tibetan politicians work against aristocratic forms 
of hierarchy and Sri Lankan activists push against ethnic and political 
divisions. These acts are both small- scale and grand, but they involve 
a commitment to principles, however ambiguous, in the face of intense 
pressure and at great risk. And these are forms of dissent that reverberate 
through the most intimate aspects of their lives, running up against 
and through the ties that bind them to others. It is not simply that the 
ties are put at risk by a commitment to high ideals. Rather these ideals 
gain meaning and possibility through these most intimate relationships. 
Intimacy marks both the possibility and the limit of dissent.
Acknowledgements
The writing of this introduction was made possible through the support 
of an ERC Horizon 2020 Consolidator Grant (648477 AnCon ERC- 
2014- CoG). We would particularly like to thank Doreen Lee and Serra 
Hakyemez for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
References
Abu- Lughod, Lila. 1990. ‘The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through 
Bedouin Women’, American Ethnologist 17 (1): 41–55.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Arendt, Hannah. 1972. Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Arendt, Hannah. 2005. The Promise of Politics, edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books.
Bashkow, Ira. 2006. The Meaning of Whitemen: Race and Modernity in Orokaiva Cultural World. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Berlant, Lauren. 1998. ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’, Critical Inquiry 24 (2): 281–88.
Berlant, Lauren and Michael Warner. 1998. ‘Sex in Public’, Critical Inquiry 24 (2): 547–66.
Bordeleau, Erik. 2017. ‘Initiating Life: Agamben and the Political Use of Intimacy’, Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 31 (3): 481–92.
Boym, Svetlana. 2010. Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Burghart, Richard. 1996. The Conditions of Listening: Essays on Religion, History and Politics in South 
Asia, edited by C.J. Fuller and Jonathan Spencer. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Candea, Matei. 2011. ‘“Our Division of the Universe”: Making a Space for the Non- Political in the 
Anthropology of Politics’, Current Anthropology 52 (3): 309–34.
Cody, Francis. 2013. The Light of Knowledge: Literacy Activism and the Politics of Writing in South 
India. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Curtis, Jennifer and Jonathan Spencer. 2012. ‘Anthropology and the Political’. In The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Anthropology, Volume 1, edited by Richard Fardon, Olivia Harris, Trevor 
H.J. Marchand, Mark Nuttall, Cris Shore, Veronica Strang and Richard A. Wilson, 168–82. 
London: SAGE Publications.
Das, Veena. 2007. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Dave, Naisargi N. 2012. Queer Activism in India: A Story in the Anthropology of Ethics. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press.
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   19 30/07/2020   13:31
20 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
Foucault, Michel. 2001. Fearless Speech, edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
Gandhi, Leela. 2006. Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the 
Politics of Friendship. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Geertz, Clifford. 1968. Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.
Geschiere, Peter. 1997. The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, 
translated by Peter Geschiere and Janet Roitman. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Hanisch, Carol. 1970. ‘The Personal is Political’. In Notes from the Second Year: Women’s Liberation: 
Major Writings of the Radical Feminists, 76–8. New York: Radical Feminism.
Hartman, Saidiya. 2019. Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval. 
London: Serpent’s Tail.
Havel, Václav. 1989. Living in Truth. London: Faber and Faber.
Heberle, Renee. 2016. ‘The Personal is Political’. In The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory, edited 
by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth, 593–609. New York: Oxford University Press.
Herzfeld, Michael. 2005. Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State. 2nd ed. London: 
Routledge.
Howe, Cymene. 2013. Intimate Activism: The Struggle for Sexual Rights in Postrevolutionary 
Nicaragua. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Jamieson, Lynn. 1998. Intimacy: Personal Relationships in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kelly, Tobias. 2015. ‘Citizenship, Cowardice, and Freedom of Conscience: British Pacifists in the 
Second World War’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 57 (3): 694–722.
Klein, Melanie. 1967. ‘Love, Guilt and Reparation’. In Love, Hate and Reparation, by Melanie Klein 
and Joan Riviere, 57–91. London: Hogarth Press.
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